





      
 
















Abstract.  We evaluate the claim that world consumption poverty has fallen during the 
1990s in light of alternative assumptions about the extent of initial poverty and the rate of 
subsequent poverty reduction in China, India, and the rest of the developing world. We 
assess the extent of poverty using two indicators: the aggregate poverty headcount and 
the poverty headcount ratio, and consider two international poverty lines that are widely 
used ($1.08/day and $2.15/day 1993 PPP). We find that under some of the assumptions 
considered, world poverty has risen. We conclude that, because of uncertainties in 
relation to the extent and trend of poverty in China, India, and the rest of the developing 
world, world poverty may or may not have increased. The extent of the increase or 
decrease in world poverty is critically dependent on the assumptions made. Our 
conclusions suggest the importance of improving the quality of global poverty statistics. 
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I.  Introduction   
 
A series of influential studies has advanced the conclusion that world poverty has fallen 
substantially since the early 1990s (see, for example, Bhalla (2002), Chen and Ravallion 
(2001, 2004) and others). Furthermore, it is widely thought, on the basis of national 
poverty estimates and studies based on the international poverty lines, that poverty has 
fallen in India and China in the 1990s. However, the present extent of poverty and the 
recent pace of poverty reduction in these two countries with the largest populations in the 
world are still debated and debatable. Estimates of the extent and trend of poverty in the 
rest of the developing world are much less favorable and also questionable. This gives 
rise to unsettling concern as to whether world poverty has actually fallen.   
 
This question takes on special importance in light of the UN’s first Millennium 
Development Goal, which calls for the halving of the percentage of the developing 
country population living under the World Bank’s “$1 per day” international poverty line 
between 1990 and 2015. Whether this goal is likely to be achieved has been a central 
concern in recent debates. For example, Bhalla (2002) avers gushingly that “Toward that 
goal…15 years hence, and already achieved today, resources are used to fight the non-
existent poverty of tomorrow.” (pp. 92-93). Chen and Ravallion (2004) conclude that “if 
the trends over 1980-2001 continue then the aggregate $1 per day poverty rate for 1990 
will be almost halved by 2015, though East and South Asia will be the only regions to 
more than halve their 1990 poverty rates.” However, they also find a low rate of 
reduction in the “$1 per day” headcount ratio measure of poverty in Latin America 
between 1990 and 2001 (from 11.3 percent to 10.5 percent)
5 and increases in the same 
measure of poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa during the period (from 44.6 percent to 45.7 
percent).
6  A cautious stance is taken by Deaton (2002), who highlights the uncertainties 
surrounding global poverty estimates. 
 
Recent debates on whether the world is on the right track in regard to poverty have 
frequently centered on whether the poverty reduction thought to have taken place in 
China and in India in the 1990s has been sufficiently to caused a decrease in poverty 
worldwide, despite the possibly poor record of poverty reduction elsewhere.
7  In order to 
assess this question, we undertake a sensitivity analysis. Specifically, we assess whether 
the conclusion that world poverty has fallen between 1990 and 2001 is robust to 
alternative assumptions concerning the extent of initial poverty and the rate of subsequent 
poverty reduction in China, India, and the developing world outside China and India 
(henceforth, ‘non-China-India’).  For each set of assumptions concerning initial poverty 
headcounts in China, India, and the remainder of the developing world, and concerning 
subsequent rates of poverty reduction in China and India, we determine the maximum 
non-China-India poverty headcount ratio in 2001 that is consistent with the hypothesis 
that world poverty has not risen between 1990 and 2001. If non-China-India poverty 
                                                 
5 The regional average reported is for Latin America and the Caribbean.  
6 Chen and Ravallion (2004) find that there has been a sustained increase in the headcount ratio in Sub-
Saharan African countries from 1993 onwards.  
7 See for example Wade and Wolf (2002).  
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headcount ratios were higher than this maximum at the end of the period then world 
poverty must be concluded to have increased between 1990 and 2001.   
 
We draw on the literature estimating poverty in China, India and world as a whole to 
identify alternative estimates of the initial extent of poverty and subsequent rates of 
poverty reduction. The extent of poverty is assessed using two indicators: the poverty 
headcount ratio (HCR) and the aggregate poverty headcount (HC), and two widely 
accepted (if weakly conceptualized) international poverty lines: $1.08/day and $2.15/day 
of 1993 “international dollars”.
8  
 
We find that under at least some plausible assumptions, world poverty must be concluded 
to have increased in the 1990s.  More generally, the analysis draws attention to the need 
to assess claims regarding the extent and trend of global poverty in light of their 
robustness to alternative reasonable specifications of underlying assumptions.  The 
assumptions made influence both the extent of poverty reduction each country is thought 
to have experienced and the relative weight attached to each such experience when 
determining the aggregate poverty trend. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section, we briefly discuss the role of the 
aggregate headcount and the headcount ratio in poverty assessment. In section III we 
describe the data sources and literature that we employ in constructing the alternative 
specifications that we examine of the initial extent of poverty in India, China and the non-
China-India developing world and of subsequent poverty reduction experiences in China 
and in India. In section IV we identify for each such specification, the maximum non-
China-India poverty headcount ratio in 2001 that is consistent with concluding that world 
poverty has not increased. Section V concludes.  
 
 
II.  How should we assess the ‘extent of poverty’? 
 
The most widely-used poverty indicators are the poverty headcount ratio (the share of 
persons identified as poor in a population) and the aggregate poverty headcount (the 
number of persons identified as poor in a population).
9   
 
Each of these indicators captures a feature of a social state which is of independent 
normative interest. The aggregate poverty headcount is a measure of the total number of 
persons suffering deprivations in a population as a result of income inadequacy, and is 
therefore surely relevant to assessing the degree of badness of a state of the world 
containing such deprivations.  In contrast, the headcount ratio is a measure of the 
likelihood that a person identified arbitrarily in a population is poor and is therefore an 
indicator of the deprivations experienced by members of a population. As such, it is 
surely also relevant to assessing the degree of badness of a state of the world containing 
such deprivations. Attempting to do away with one of these indicators altogether can lead 
                                                 
8 See Chen and Ravallion (2001). 
9 The merits and demerits of each of these indicators are thoughtfully examined by Subramanian (2002) 
who presents relevant axioms for their assessment.  We describe these in Appendix A.   
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to blindnesses to the salient features of a social state which are captured by the other 
indicator, and as a result to insupportable conclusions. 
 
For example, the poverty headcount ratio depends on the size of the non-poor population. 
As a result, the ‘extent of poverty’ as measured by the indicator can be made to be 
arbitrarily small if the size of the non-poor population is made to be sufficiently large. As 
a result, interventions which influence the number of non-poor persons but do not affect 
the consumption levels of the poor may be found to “reduce poverty”. In contrast, the 
aggregate poverty headcount is insensitive to the size and incomes of the non-poor 
population.  As a result interventions that reduce the likelihood that a member of a 
population is poor may fail to be considered to be poverty reducing, according to this 
indicator.  A single minded focus on either measure may lead to “repugnant conclusions” 
such as these. 
 
Of course, both indicators fail to possess several other desirable properties: for example 
both are unchanged when the consumption level of a person who is already poor falls 
further, or when a regressive transfer takes place among the poor.
10  It may be concluded 
that the indicators are not only independently insufficient to adequately assess the ‘extent 
of poverty’ but that they are jointly insufficient. Nevertheless, both indicators are 
informative. The relative significance to be attached to the two indicators or indeed others 
in the course of both descriptive and normative assessments inevitably depends on the 
researcher’s own judgments as to what features are desirable in a poverty indicator 
required for a specific purpose.  Normative judgments may also be required in the 
detailed specification of each indicator.  For example, the “denominator” of the 
headcount ratio depends on the choice of an appropriate reference population.  As shall 




III.  Poverty in China, India and the rest of the developing world 
 
In this section we draw on the literature to construct alternative plausible scenarios 
regarding the extent and trend of consumption poverty in China, India and the rest of the 
developing world. It is important to note that we do not necessarily take any of the 
examined estimates to be correct, nor do we necessarily endorse any of the international 
poverty lines that are currently widely used in global poverty analysis and that we 
accordingly employ here (i.e., $1.08/day and $2.15/day 1993 PPP).
11 A discussion of the 
uncertainties associated with poverty estimates for China can be found in Riskin (2004) 
and Reddy and Minoiu (2005). A discussion of the debate on Indian poverty estimates 
can be found in Deaton (2004) and in Sen and Himanshu (2004).  Finally, Reddy and 
Pogge (2003) discuss uncertainties associated with poverty estimates for the world as a 
whole.  
 
                                                 
10 See Sen (1983), Appendix C. 
11 Indeed the money-metric approach to international poverty estimation of which these are a part has 
elsewhere been criticized by one of the authors (see e.g. Reddy and Pogge (2003)).  
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a.  Poverty Estimates for China 
 
There are few poverty estimates for China, especially on the basis of the international 
poverty lines of $1.08 and $2.15 per day. This may be for at least two distinct reasons: 
the lack of publicly available large household consumption or income surveys at multiple 
points in time, and the country’s non-participation in the International Price Comparison 
Program (which precludes the use of PPPs derived on the basis of an official benchmark 
survey). In this paper, the studies on which we draw to obtain Chinese poverty estimates 
are Chen and Ravallion (2004) (henceforth, ‘CR’) and Reddy and Minoiu (2005) 
(henceforth, ‘RM’).  
 
i.    International poverty line: $1.08/day  
 
Using tabulated data from underlying household surveys, CR find that the $1.08/day 
poverty headcount ratio has fallen in China from 33 percent in 1990 to 16.6 percent in 
2001. The corresponding aggregate poverty headcounts are 374.8 million (1990) and 
211.6 million (2001).  These estimates are obtained by (1) translating the international 
poverty lines into 1993 local currency units using a 1993 consumption PPP of 1.4185 
Yuan/$, (2) translating the resulting poverty lines into the local currency units of each 
survey year using the official consumer price index for rural and urban areas, and (3) 
using the World Bank’s POVCAL software to estimate income distributions based on 
grouped consumption data originating in household surveys and provided to CR by the 
Chinese National Statistical Bureau.  
 
RM propose several sets of poverty estimates for China in the 1990s, based on alternative 
plausible assumptions concerning: (a) consumption PPPs ; (b) true private per capita 
incomes; (c) consumption to income ratios and (d) consumer price indices.  RM use 
income shares for different years in the 1990s to produce poverty estimates resulting 
from different plausible combinations of underlying assumptions, identifying certain 
combinations as most plausible. 
 
To simplify the representation of poverty scenarios for China, we use the same notation 
as RM to describe each alternative set of poverty estimates by a vector of four parameters 
which specifies the assumptions underlying the estimates:  l [, , , ] P PPP Y θ π .  PPP is a 
consumption purchasing power parity conversion factor used in translating an 
international poverty line into its national currency “equivalent”.  l P Y  refers to the method 
employed to estimate true per capita private income (and can be either NAICE = national 
accounts income-based consumption estimates, or SICE = survey income-based 
consumption estimates). θ  is the method of estimating the fraction of true per capita 
private income devoted to consumption by each income group (which can be identified 
either with the total household expenditure to GDP ratio as drawn from the national 
accounts,  NA θ  or from surveys,  S θ ). Finally, π  is the consumer price index used to 
describe consumption levels (and poverty lines) in constant prices (and can be either the 
official consumer price index,  off π , or an “adjusted” consumer price index,  adj π , that may 
be viewed as more appropriate for the poor).   
  6
We present the Chinese poverty estimates drawn from RM in Table 1. Poverty estimates 
RM(1) to RM(3) are obtained from a national accounts based consumption to income 
ratio for each year which is applied invariantly constant across the income spectrum to 
obtain a consumption profile of the population in that year, and from using the official 
consumer price index to express the consumption means for each income group in 
constant 1993 currency units. The alternative estimates are labeled according to their 
underlying assumptions, by the set of parameters ( , NA off θ π ).  
 
Poverty headcount ratios RM(4) and RM(5) use survey-based, decile-specific shares of 
consumption in income to obtain the consumption profile from the income distribution 
and income mean, and decile-specific adjusted inflation rates to express these in constant 
1993 prices. Therefore, they correspond to the set of parameters ( , Sa d j θ π ).
12  
 
Table 1 China’s $1.08/day Poverty headcount ratios  
Source: Reddy and Minoiu (2005) and authors’ estimations using POVCAL, Generalized Quadratic 
interpolation method. 
 
In conclusion, for the $1.08/day poverty line, we use six scenarios for China’s poverty: 
CR, and RM(1) through RM(5).    
 
                                                 
12  Note that we exclude from this table one set of poverty estimates corresponding to the following 
combination of underlying parameters: ( , , , LOW S adj PPP NAICE θ π ) . The reason for its exclusion is that it 
results in a headcount ratio of 2.95 percent in 1990 and 0 percent in 2001. Based on evidence from the 
literature, we deem this poverty level for China to be too low to be credible.  Note also that RM do not 
report headcount ratios for 1990 due to a failure of the World Bank’s POVCAL software to estimate 
poverty based on the 1990 consumption profile for China corresponding to ( , S adj θ π ).  This malfunction has 
been recognized by the authors of the software  (at the World Bank) but the source of the problem has not 
been identified.  Since the 1990 poverty estimates are needed in this paper, we estimate them by replacing  
the 1990 income shares with those of 1992, and computing the 1990 income profile by applying the 1990 
per capita GDP to the (1992) income shares. The 1990 consumption profile thus obtained is reported in 
Appendix B. 
13  INTERMEDIATE PPP refers to the World Bank default 1993 consumption PPP of 1.4185 Yuan/$ for China.  
Scenario  Sets of underlying parameters  1990  2001 
CR  , INTERMEDIATE off PPP π
13  33.0 16.6 
RM (1)  (,) LOW PPP NAICE   13.2 4.9 
RM (2)  (, ) HIGH PPP NAICE =(, ) LOW PPP SICE   50.8 23.0 
RM (3) 
 
, NA off θ π  
(, ) HIGH PPP SICE   88.0 54.0 
RM (4)  (, ) HIGH PPP NAICE =(, ) LOW PPP SICE   32.3 6.1 
RM (5) 
 
, Sa d j θ π   (, ) HIGH PPP SICE   75.1 31.9  
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ii. International poverty line: $2.15/day  
 
The first set of poverty estimates that we consider for China corresponding to the 
$2.15/day poverty line are drawn from CR , according to which Chinese poverty as 
defined by this poverty line has fallen from 72.6 percent (1990) to 46.7 percent (2001).
14  
 
We supplement these figures with 1990 and 2001 headcount ratios computed using the 
consumption profile for 1990 presented in Appendix B as well as that for 2001 obtained 
from publicly available income shares for that year.
 15 As noted above, the consumption 
profiles are constructed so as to reflect the possibility of using either China’s national 
accounts and or surveys to identify consumption to income ratios, the possibility of using 
either official or ‘adjusted’ inflation rates, the possibility of using either national accounts 
or surveys to estimate income means and alternative possible consumption PPPs that may 
be used to translate the international poverty line into local currency units. The  $2.15/day 
headcount ratios for China that correspond to different combinations of underlying 
assumptions are reported in Table 2.
16  
 
Table 2 China’s $2.15/day poverty headcount ratios   
 
Scenario  Sets of underlying parameters  1990 2001 
CR   , INTERMEDIATE off PPP π   72.6       46.7 
RM (1)*  (,) LOW PPP NAICE   48.5 21.8 
RM (2)*  
 
, NA off θ π   (, ) HIGH PPP NAICE =(, ) LOW PPP SICE 86.9 52.4 
RM (4)*   (,) LOW PPP NAICE   30.3 5.1 
RM (5)*  (, ) HIGH PPP NAICE =(, ) LOW PPP SICE 73.3 30.4 
RM (6)* 
 
, Sa d j θ π  
 
(, ) HIGH PPP SICE   96.3 65.2 
Source: Authors’ calculations using POVAL, Generalized Quadratic interpolation method. 
 
In conclusion, for the $2.15/day poverty line, we use six Chinese poverty scenarios: CR,  
and RM(1)*, RM(2)*, RM(4)*, RM(5)* and RM(6)*. 
 
 
                                                 
14 Another set of $2.15/day poverty headcount ratios can be obtained for 1990 and 2001 using the World 
Bank’s POVCALNET on-line database (using the default consumption PPP of 1.4185 Yuan/$). However, 
the results are very close to those reported by CR, and we thus do not report them here.  
15 The consumption profile for 2001 is drawn from RM (2005, pp. 13), and is not reported here.  
16 Note that we exclude from this table one set of poverty estimates corresponding to the following 
combination of underlying parameters: ( , , , HIGH NA off PPP SICE θ π ) . The poverty line associated with this 
combination of parameters is outside the admissible bounds given by POVCAL. We consider this poverty 
line to be so high as to lack credibility as a poverty line that is appropriate to employ in international 
comparisons and do not therefore consider it further.   
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b.  Poverty Estimates for India  
 
i.    International poverty line: $1.08/day  
 
Indian poverty estimates during the 1990s have been the subject of an extended debate 
primarily due to changes in survey methodology in the 1999/2000 thick round of India’s 
National Sample Survey relative to previous rounds, which led to difficulties in 
comparing estimates across rounds (for a detailed account of the debate, see Deaton 
(2004)).   
 
Views on the extent of poverty reduction in the 1990s vary widely: for example, Bhalla 
(2000) takes the optimistic view that the national poverty headcount ratio in India fell by 
50 percent between 1990 and 1998 (namely, from 26 percent to 13 percent; pp. 31). In 
contrast, the analysis of Sen and Himanshu (2004) leads them to the conclusion that 
between 1993/94 (50
th round) and 1999/00 (55
th round) the poverty headcount ratio fell 
by no more than 3 percentage points (from 35.97 percent to 32.97 percent; pp. 4259) and 
the aggregate headcount may have well increased over the period.  We may call this view 
pessimistic by contrast to that of Bhalla, without any suggestion that either is correct.  
Official poverty estimates indicate that the national poverty headcount ratio was 35.11 
percent in 1990/91 (based on a thin round) and 35.97 percent in 1993/94 (50
th thick 
round). The estimates are based on the national poverty line, which is approximately 80 
percent of the $1.08/day international standard.  Deaton and Dreze (2002) posit a rate of 
poverty reduction that is in an intermediate range.  They conclude based on their most 
comprehensive assessments, that between 1987-88 and 1990-00 the poverty headcount 
ratio fell from 39.4 to 26.3 percent in rural areas and from 22.5 to 12 percent in urban 
areas (pp. 3730).  We do not take a view here on what has actually happened in India. 
Rather, we examine the implications of alternative assumptions concerning what has 
happened for conclusions concerning the trend of global poverty in the 1990s. 
 
To determine Indian poverty headcounts for 1990 for purposes of this analysis, we 
consider three alternative baseline (1990) poverty levels: 42.10 percent (CR), 40 percent 
(which we deem to be a plausible baseline poverty headcount ratio given that the 1993/94 
official headcount ratio is 35.97 percent, that the official poverty line is 80 percent of the 
rupee equivalent of the $1.08/day threshold
17, and that official statistics show little 
poverty reduction in the period from 1990 to 1993/94), and 35.11 percent (i.e., the 
official estimate based on the 1990/91 thin round, using the national poverty line).  
 
To obtain Indian poverty headcounts for 2001, we assume two alternative poverty 
reduction rates and apply them to the assumed initial headcount ratio.  These are an 
optimistic poverty reduction scenario of 50 percent (corresponding to Bhalla (2000)) and 
a pessimistic poverty reduction scenario of 10 percent. Our “pessimistic” rate of 
reduction of 10 percent is nevertheless more optimistic than that proposed by Sen and 
Himanshu (2004), who claim that the highest decrease in the national headcount ratio that 
is suggested by the survey data is 8.34 percent (or 3 percentage points) between 1993/94 
and 1999/00.  
                                                 
17  As translated using a World Bank provided 1993 consumption PPP for India.  
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The six resulting scenarios for the extent and trend of poverty in the 1990s in India are 
presented in Table 3.  
 
Table 3 India’s $1.08/day Poverty headcount ratios   
 
 
ii.    International poverty line: $2.15/day  
 
For the $2.15/day international poverty line, we use only one set of headcount ratio 
estimates drawn from CR: 86.1 percent in 1990 and 79.9 percent in 2001, as there are no 
alternative estimates for a poverty line in a corresponding range that are available in the 
literature on Indian poverty.  
 
 
c.  Poverty estimates for the developing world outside China and India  
 
The baseline $1.08/day and $2.15/day non-China-India headcount ratios that we employ 
for 1990 are those of CR (20.14 percent and 46.16 percent, respectively).  However, in 
order to reflect uncertainties about these estimates, we allow for the possibility that the 
level of the headcount ratio in 1990 judged according to alternative means or better data 
may have been higher or lower, by multiplying the headcount ratio provided by CR by a 
range of plausible factors (0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.5 and 2).  By doing so, we allow the $1.08/day 
aggregate headcount in the developing world outside India and China to vary between 
243.15 million and 972.6 million (CR’s estimate is 486.3 million) so as to explore the 
impact of alternative assumptions.
18 
                                                 
18 For a variety of reasons, it seems reasonable to identify some (necessarily imprecise)  ‘confidence 
bounds’ to reflect the uncertainties associated with these estimates. For example, the total population that is 
not covered by household surveys is around 400 million people.  Poverty headcount ratios for this 
population are imputed by C-R from regional averages for countries for which they do have surveys. Based 
on population statistics for 2001, the following percentages of the population of different regions were not 
directly represented by household surveys or tabulated data in CR’s poverty estimates: 25.95 percent 
(Middle East and North Africa), 22.14 percent (Sub-Saharan Africa), 4.69 (Latin America and Caribbean), 
and smaller percentages for East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and South Asia. For the countries 
for which there is no data, it is assumed by CR that the country’s poverty headcount ratio is the same as the 
regional average. The regional average is computed by dividing the aggregate headcounts for the countries 
for which data was available by the population of these countries. The regional ‘average’ headcount ratio is 
then imputed to countries for which data is not available. We presume that a new regional average was 
Scenario  1990 poverty headcount  Rate of poverty reduction  1990  2001 
(1)  Optimistic: 50 percent  42.1  21.05
(2) 
 
CR   Pessimistic: 10 percent  42.1  37.89
(3)  Optimistic: 50 percent  40.0  20.0 
(4) 
Based on 1993/94  official headcount 
ratio (thick round) adjusted to accord 
with international poverty line   Pessimistic: 10 percent  40.0  36.0 
(5)  Optimistic: 50 percent  35.11  17.56
(6) 
Based on 1990/91  official headcount 
ratio (thin round) and national 
poverty line  Pessimistic: 10 percent  35.11  31.06 
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IV.  Findings  
 
We compute the maximum 2001 non-China-India poverty headcount ratio (and 
correspondingly, the maximum increase in the non-China-India headcount ratio between 
1990 and 2001) that is consistent with the hypothesis that world poverty has not increased, 
for each set of assumptions that we admit. The method by which we obtain the minimum 
non-China-India 2001 poverty headcount ratios that are consistent with non-decreasing 
world poverty (henceforth, ‘threshold non-China-India headcount ratios’) when the extent 
of poverty is measured by both the world poverty headcount ratio, and the world 
aggregate poverty headcount, is described in Appendix C.   
 
It is evident from the expressions derived there that a higher initial headcount ratio in 
India or China entails higher threshold non-China-India headcount ratios.  Similarly, a 
lower final headcount ratio (i.e. a higher rate of reduction of poverty over the period) in 
India or China entails higher threshold non-China-India headcount ratios.  The reasons 
that this is so are straightforward.  A higher initial headcount ratio in India or China 
entails that poverty reduction in these countries contributes a greater relative “weight” in 
the calculation of the global poverty headcount (or headcount ratio). Since poverty 
decreased in both of these countries over the period, the higher are these weights, the 
larger is the increase in poverty required in the non-China-India developing world to 
“counteract” the lowering of the poverty headcount ratio in India and China.  A lower 
final headcount ratio (i.e., a higher rate of reduction of poverty over the period) in India 
or China similarly entails that the rate of increase of poverty in the non-China-India 
developing world must be higher in order to “counteract” the decrease in global poverty 
arising from these two countries.  The assumed initial extent f poverty in the developing 
world outside of China and India is also crucial, as it too influences the relative weight 
that is attached to the poverty reduction experiences in China, India and the rest of the 
world in the assessment of aggregate poverty reduction experience.   
 
If rates of poverty reduction were relatively high in the countries in which the initial 
poverty headcount was relatively high, an estimated aggregate poverty reduction will be 
consequently high. The threshold non-China-India headcount ratio will be highest when 
the initial poverty headcount in China and in India is assumed to be high relative to that 
in other countries, and poverty reduction in China and in India is assumed to have been 
high in absolute terms. The rate of increase in poverty in the non-China-India developing 
world needed to reverse the conclusion that world poverty has fallen will be of a large 
magnitude in such a case.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
afterwards computed (and is reported in the paper), though this is not explicitly stated in CR. Other reasons 
for concern regarding the validity and precision of poverty estimates for the developing world are outlined 
in Reddy and Pogge (2003).  They include the lack of price surveys on the basis of which to construct PPPs 
for many countries, the inappropriateness of the PPPs that are constructed, and the lack of alignment of 
survey years and estimation years.  
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The results concerning the threshold non-China-India headcount ratios are presented in 
Tables 1D-5D (for the headcount ratio measure of the extent of world poverty) and in 
Tables 6D-10D (for the aggregate headcount measure of the extent of world poverty).   
 
We assess the world poverty headcount ratio as a percentage of the developing world 
population, following CR. We do this in order to maintain comparability with their 
results, although it is far from obvious that this is an appropriate choice.  From a 
normative standpoint, there is good reason to hold that the share of the entire world 
population that is poor is of greater interest. Specifying the headcount ratio in this way 
will lead to a lower estimated headcount ratio and also to a lower estimated rate of 
reduction of the headcount ratio (since the developing world population has grown at a 
faster rate than the world population as a whole).
19 Correspondingly, the threshold non-
China-India headcount ratios will be lower when the world population is taken to be the 
denominator than when the developing world population is taken to be the denominator 
of the world poverty headcount ratio.  Although we do not report below the threshold 
non-China-India headcount ratios for this case, it can be inferred that they lie between 
those we do report (for the case in which the extent of world poverty is assessed by the 
aggregate headcount and for the case in which it is assessed by the headcount ratio taking 
the developing country population as the denominator).  The reason why is clear.  The 
threshold associated with the aggregate headcount is the same as that associated with the 
headcount ratio when ‘world’ population growth is nil (see Appendix C).  Since the 
function that describes the relation of the threshold to underlying parameters is 
continuous and is an increasing function of world population growth, the threshold 
associated with the world headcount ratio when population growth is positive and small 
is lower than that associated with the world headcount ratio when population growth is 
positive and large.  Since developing world population growth has been higher than 
world total population growth, it follows that the threshold associated with the headcount 
ratio when the ‘world’ is taken to be the entire world lies between that arising when the 
‘world’ is taken to be the developing world (as in CR) and that associated with the 
aggregate headcount. The case in which the world population is taken as the denominator 
of the headcount ratio is of great normative interest.  In that case, the extent of the 
increase in poverty outside China and India that is needed to overturn the conclusion that 




a.  Has the $1.08/day world poverty headcount ratio really fallen between 
1990 and 2001?  
 
We initially consider the possibility that the CR non-China-India headcount ratio for 
1990 is correct. It is apparent from Table 1D that under this assumption, regardless of the 
poverty reduction scenario for India, the scenario in which the extent of poverty in China 
in 1990 is lowest (RM(1)) is that in which the country’s contribution to global poverty 
                                                 
19 For further discussion of this point in relation to the first Millennium Development Goal, see Pogge 
(2004).  
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reduction has the smallest weight, and in which accordingly it is easiest to reverse the 
conclusion that world poverty has fallen.  
 
Under the assumption that the CR 1990 headcount ratio outside China and India is correct, 
the highest threshold non-China-India headcount ratio arises in the scenarios in which 
high poverty reduction takes place from a high initial level in India (from 42.10 to 21.05 
percentage points, i.e. the ‘optimistic’ scenario) and in China (from 75.1 to 31.9 
percentage points, i.e., RM(5)).  When countries that possess large numbers of poor 
persons experience a high rate of poverty reduction, the increase in poverty elsewhere 
that is needed to overturn this conclusion must also be high.   
 
Naturally, as Tables 1D-5D show, the higher the assumed non-China-India poverty 
headcount in 1990, the easier it becomes to reverse the conclusion that world poverty has 
decreased between 1990 and 2001. If the absolute headcount outside China and India in 
2001 were 972.6 million instead of CR’s estimate of 486.3 million (i.e., twice higher), 
then an increase in the non-China-India poverty headcount ratio of only 11 percent (or 
4.35 pp) by 2001 would be consistent with world poverty having increased, despite 
reductions in poverty in both India and China (see Table 5D).  
 
 
b.  Has the $1.08/day world aggregate poverty headcount really fallen 
between 1990 and 2001?  
 
It is substantially easier to reverse the conclusion that the number of poor persons in the 
world has decreased than it is to reverse the same conclusion using the poverty headcount 
ratio as the relevant poverty indicator, due to increases in the population of the 
developing world in the period considered. (See Tables 6D-10D.) 
 
Under some plausible specifications of underlying assumptions, the total number of 
“$1.08 per day poor”  must be concluded to have increased between 1990 and 2001 even 
though there have been reductions in the poverty headcount ratios in China, India, and 
indeed, very possibly outside China and India. This is simply because the increase in the 
population of the developing world gives rise to a cleavage between the two measures of 
the extent of poverty. 
  
What do current estimates tell us about the evolution of world poverty? Can the CR 
estimates themselves be consistent with the conclusion that world poverty has actually 
increased in the 1990s? CR report a reduction in the $1.08/day poverty headcount ratio 
outside China and India from 20.14 percent (1990) to 18.29 percent (2001), i.e. a 
decrease of 1.9 percentage points. Based on the alternative specifications of underlying 
assumptions that we consider, if we measure the extent of poverty by the headcount ratio 
and maintain that CR’s 1990 non-India-China poverty headcount estimate is correct (at 
20.14 percent) then the extent of world poverty could not have increased (Tables 1D-5D).  
However, Table 6D shows that a fall in the world headcount ratio from 20.41 percent to a 
level higher than 18.91 percent (i.e., by at most 1.5 percentage points) is consistent with 
the number of “$1.08 per day poor” having increased under some of the assumptions  
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considered. Thus, a reduction in the non-China-India headcount index of less than 1.5 
percentage points (given the estimates of CR for China and India and for the initial non-
China-India headcount ratio) would be consistent with the number of “$1.08 per day 
poor” in the developing world having increased. Even a moderate error in CR’s estimated 
rate of reduction could ensure this result.  
 
If we assume that the non-China-India CR estimate of the 1990 headcount ratio is 
incorrect and is higher than what CR report it becomes still easier to sustain the 
conclusion of a rising aggregate world poverty headcount.  In particular, if we assume 
that the 1990 Non-China-India headcount ratio is twice that reported by CR, then to 
maintain the conclusion that the number of “$1.08 per day poor” has fallen between 1990 
and 2001, it suffices to assume that the fall in the headcount ratio outside of China and 
India was less than 12 percent (see Table 10D, assuming a reduction in Indian poverty 
from 42.10 to 37.89 and RM(1) estimates for China). A reduction in the non-China-India 
poverty headcount ratio of less than 12 percent is, under appropriate assumptions 
concerning poverty trends in India and China, consistent with the conclusion that the 
number of “$1.08 per day poor” has risen. 
  
The speculation that CR’s non-China-India estimate for 1990 is “low” may not be 
unreasonable, especially if we have in mind that the international poverty line should be 
aligned with a norm of adequacy that is roughly related to prevailing standards in poor 
countries (as is claimed on behalf of the $1/day international poverty line by CR).  In this 
respect, it is informative to compare the nutritionally based poverty estimates produced 
by the Economic Commission on Latin America (ECLA) following the methodology of 
Altimir (1979) with those produced by CR using their lower poverty line.  As will be 
seen from this comparison (summarized in Appendix E) Latin American poverty 
headcounts based on the ECLA approach are substantially higher than those of CR in 
certain countries. Moreover, the regional average reported by ECLA is notably higher.  
The discrepancies between estimates produced by these two methodologies draw 
attention to the uncertainties attached to current regional and global poverty estimates 
(arising as a result of diverse factors, as pointed to by Reddy and Pogge (2003)).
20   
 
Another conclusion which emerges from Tables 1D-10D is that the threshold non-China-
India headcount ratio is more sensitive to the assumptions that are made concerning 
China than it is to the assumptions that are made concerning India. This fact illustrates 
the potential value of further research producing poverty estimates for China that are 
reliable and internationally comparable.  
 
 
c.  Has $2.15/day world poverty really fallen between 1990 and 2001?  
 
For the $2.15/day international poverty threshold, the conclusions are similar. (See 
Appendix F.) It is easiest to reverse the conclusion that the $2.15/day world poverty 
headcount ratio has fallen if the initial non-China-India poverty headcount index is 
                                                 
20 On which, see also footnote 18 above.  
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assumed to have been underestimated by CR, and if  the rate of poverty reduction in 
China is assumed to be comparatively low. The $2.15/day non-China-India headcount 
ratio has remained virtually unchanged according to CR’s estimates at approximately 46 
percent (its 1990 level). However, the world headcount ratio has fallen between 1990 and 
2001 from 60.8 percent to 52.9 percent. This poverty reduction must have been driven, 
therefore, by poverty reduction in China and India. Table 1F shows that under some 
assumptions regarding initial Chinese and Indian poverty levels and the subsequent pace 
of poverty reduction, an increase as small as 13 percent in the non-China-India headcount 
ratio would reverse the conclusion that world poverty (by the $2.15/day international 
poverty threshold) has fallen.   
 
This “falling poverty” conclusion is easiest to reverse, again, when the extent of world 
poverty is assessed according to  the aggregate headcount ratio.  CR themselves report an 
increase in the number of “$2.15 per day poor” from 2,653.8 million (1990) to 2,735.6 
million (2001). Table 2F shows that, under various scenarios for China and assuming an 
underestimation of the 1990 non-China-India poverty headcount by a factor of two, 
reductions in the non-China-India poverty headcount as large as 10 percent are consistent 
with increases in the number of worldwide “$2.15 per day poor”.  
 
 
V.  Conclusions  
 
In this paper we have scrutinized the conclusion widely put forward that world poverty 
headcounts and headcount ratios have fallen during the 1990s.  We have examined the 
robustness of this conclusion to alternative assumptions concerning the initial extent of 
poverty and subsequent poverty reduction experience in China, India and the rest of the 
developing world, informed by the literature on poverty estimates for these countries and 
for the world as a whole. We have considered two international poverty lines: $1.08/day 
and $2.15/day (1993 PPP) which are widely used within the currently dominant “money-
metric” approach to international poverty assessment.   
 
We found that under many assumptions, the developing world headcount ratio has 
decreased in the 1990s.  However, under some plausible assumptions, the developing 
world headcount ratio, and especially the developing world aggregate headcount, may 
well have increased in the period. It may be concluded that the magnitude of the increase 
or decrease in the extent of world poverty is also crucially dependent on the assumptions 
made. In any event, the relatively slow rate of reduction of poverty outside China and 
India, and especially in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, gives great reason for 
concern that goals of reducing poverty will fail to be met in these regions, even if they are 
met on a global basis.  
 
Our results call for caution in coming to the conclusion that world poverty has fallen in 
the 1990s, and that global poverty reduction goals are on their way to being achieved.  
They also point to the need for international investment in more credible approaches to 
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Appendix A. An axiomatic approach to the comparison of the aggregate headcount 
and the headcount ratio  
 
 
Subramanian (2002) proposes the following axioms:  
 
(1) The Strong Focus Axiom states that the extent of poverty should be the same for two 
income vectors if their sub-vectors of incomes corresponding to poor persons are 
identical. This does not require that the two income vectors are of the same dimension. A 
weaker version of the axiom (the Focus Axiom) would require that the dimension of the 
two income vectors be the same.  
 
(2) The Weak Poverty Growth Axiom requires that adding an individual with an 
income level lower than the poverty line to the society should lead to an increase in the 
poverty indicator, if there is already at least one non-poor person in the society.  
 
(3) The Replication Invariance Axiom demands that a k-fold replication of the income 
vector should leave the value of the poverty indicator unchanged.  This axiom expresses 
the view that poverty should be regarded as a property that is properly assessed relative to 
the size of the population. A weaker version of this axiom is Replication Scaling, which 
requires that a poverty indicator should increase by the factor k when a k-fold replication 
of the incomes of the poor occurs.   
 
Subramanian (2002) proves an impossibility result: No poverty indicator can be 
simultaneously consistent with Strong Focus, Weak Poverty Growth, and Replication 
Invariance.  
 
The poverty headcount ratio is consistent with the following three axioms: Focus, Weak 
Poverty Growth, and Replication Invariance.  The aggregate poverty headcount, in turn, 
is consistent with the following three axioms: Strong Focus, Weak Poverty Growth, and 
Replication Scaling. 
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Appendix B.  China’s income shares and consumption profiles for 1990 and 1992  
 
Columns [2] and [3] report income shares for 1990 and 1992.  Column [4] reports the 
1990 consumption profiles corresponding to a ‘least refined’ and a ‘most refined’ set of 
underlying parameters. The least refined set of parameters include the national accounts 
consumption to income ratios (i.e., the share of total household expenditure in GDP) 
which is constant across the income deciles, as well as decile-constant official CPI). The 
most refined set of parameters are the survey-based shares of consumption in income, 
which vary across the income spectrum, and decile-specific adjusted CPIs.   However, the 
set of consumption means presented in column [4’] cannot be entered into the World 
Bank’s POVCAL software to estimate poverty due to a software failure. Column [5’] 
reports the ‘most refined’ 1990 consumption profile constructed using the 1992 income 
shares and the 1990 per capita GDP.   
 
 
    1990 consumption profiles 









(% share of 
GDP) 












Bottom  10%  3.08  2.57 308.3 627.7 523.7 
10%  4.25  3.6  425.4 666.9 564.9 
10%  5.36  4.64 536.4 808.3 699.7 
10%  6.49  5.73 649.5 925.8 817.4 
10% 7.65 6.95 765.6  1060.1  963.1 
10% 8.97 8.34 897.7  1389.3  1291.7 
10%  10.55  10.1  1055.9 1548.0 1482.0 
10%  12.66  12.51 1267.0 1831.8 1810.1 
10%  16.01  16.55 1602.3 2186.0 2259.7 
Top  10%  24.98  29.01 2500.1 2799.9 3251.6 
Source: Columns [4] and [4’] are from RM (2005). Column [5’]: Authors’ calculations.   
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Appendix C. Computing the maximum poverty level outside China and India in 
2001 consistent with the hypothesis that world poverty has not increased between 
1990 and 2001  
 
Denote the headcount ratios by θ . P denotes the size of the population (indexed by t for 
the world, i for India and C for China).   
 
The world poverty headcount ratio has not decreased between 1990 ( 1 world θ ) and 2001 
( 2 world θ ) if  12 world world θ θ ≤ . This is equivalent to writing:  
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The world poverty aggregate headcount has not decreased between 1990 ( 1 world θ ) and 
2001 ( 2 world θ ) if  11 22 world t world t PP θ θ ≤ . This is equivalent to writing:  
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Appendix D.  Results (Poverty Line: $ 1.08 / DAY)  
 
The maximum non-China-India poverty headcount ratio in 2001 which is consistent with the hypothesis that the extent of world 
poverty (measured by the headcount ratio) has not increased between 1990 and 2001 is reported in the upper part of each of the tables 
below.  It is also expressed as a share of the non-China-India 1990 poverty headcount ratio in the lower part of each table. The figures 
in the lower part of each table can therefore be interpreted as the factors by which world poverty outside India and China would have 
had to increase to leave world poverty unchanged between 1990 and 2001 under each set of assumptions considered. If the specified 
assumptions are maintained and if it is assumed that the  headcount ratio outside India and China increased by a factor higher than that 
reported in the tables, then it must be concluded that world poverty has increased.  
 
Table 1D. Assumption: the non-China-India 1990 poverty headcount ratio is correct: 20.41 percent  
 
  India India India 
Scenario Æ Optimistic  Pessimistic  Optimistic  Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic 
China↓   42.10 to 21.05  42.10 to 37.89  40 to 20  40 to 36  35.11 to 17.56  35.11 to 31.6 
        
RM  (1)  31.32% 25.23% 30.96% 25.18% 30.13% 25.05% 
CR  35.41% 29.32% 35.05% 29.27% 34.22% 29.14% 
RM  (4)  39.75% 33.67% 39.40% 33.61% 38.56% 33.49% 
RM  (2)  40.92% 34.83% 40.56% 34.78% 39.72% 34.65% 
RM  (3)  44.59% 38.50% 44.23% 38.44% 43.39% 38.32% 
RM(5)  48.37% 42.28% 48.01% 42.23% 47.17% 42.10% 
 
  India India India 
Scenario  Æ Optimistic  Pessimistic  Optimistic  Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic 
China ↓   42.10 to 21.05  42.10 to 37.89  40 to 20  40 to 36  35.11 to 17.56  35.11 to 31.6 
        
RM  (1)  1.53 1.24 1.52 1.23 1.48 1.23 
CR  1.73 1.44 1.72 1.43 1.68 1.43 
RM  (4)  1.95 1.65 1.93 1.65 1.89 1.64 
RM  (2)  2.00 1.71 1.99 1.70 1.95 1.70 
RM  (3)  2.18 1.89 2.17 1.88 2.13 1.88 
RM(5)  2.37 2.07 2.35 2.07 2.31 2.06  
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Table 2D. Assumption: the non-China-India 1990 poverty headcount ratio is 0.5 x 20.41%=10.21% 
 
  India India India 
Scenario Æ Optimistic  Pessimistic  Optimistic  Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic 
  42.10 to 21.05  42.10 to 37.89  40 to 20  40 to 36  35.11 to 17.56  35.11 to 31.6 
China ↓         
        
RM  (1)  21.26% 15.18% 20.07% 14.99% 20.07% 14.99% 
CR  25.35% 19.26% 24.99% 19.21% 24.16% 19.08% 
RM  (4)  29.70% 23.61% 29.34% 23.56% 28.50% 23.43% 
RM  (2)  30.86% 24.77% 29.67% 24.59% 29.67% 24.59% 
RM  (3)  34.53% 28.44% 33.33% 28.26% 33.33% 28.26% 
RM  (5)  38.31% 32.22% 37.95% 32.17% 37.11% 32.04% 
        
 
  India India India 
Scenario  Æ Optimistic  Pessimistic  Optimistic  Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic 
  42.10 to 21.05  42.10 to 37.89  40 to 20  40 to 36  35.11 to 17.56  35.11 to 31.6 
China ↓         
        
RM  (1)  2.08 1.49 1.97 1.47 1.97 1.47 
CR  2.48 1.89 2.45 1.88 2.37 1.87 
RM  (4)  2.91 2.31 2.87 2.31 2.79 2.30 
RM  (2)  3.02 2.43 2.91 2.41 2.91 2.41 
RM  (3)  3.38 2.79 3.27 2.77 3.27 2.77 
RM  (5)  3.75 3.16 3.72 3.15 3.64 3.14 
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Table 3D. Assumption: the non-China-India 1990 poverty headcount ratio is 0.75 x 20.41%=15.31% 
 
  India India India 
Scenario Æ Optimistic  Pessimistic  Optimistic  Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic 
  42.10 to 21.05  42.10 to 37.89  40 to 20  40 to 36  35.11 to 17.56  35.11 to 31.6 
China↓         
        
RM  (1)  26.29% 20.20% 25.93% 20.15% 25.10% 20.02% 
CR  30.38% 24.29% 30.02% 24.24% 29.19% 24.11% 
RM  (4)  34.73% 28.64% 34.37% 28.58% 33.53% 28.46% 
RM  (2)  35.89% 29.80% 35.53% 29.75% 34.70% 29.62% 
RM  (3)  39.56% 33.47% 39.20% 33.42% 38.36% 33.29% 
RM  (5)  43.34% 37.25% 42.98% 37.20% 42.14% 37.07% 
        
 
  India India India 
Scenario  Æ Optimistic  Pessimistic  Optimistic  Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic 
  42.10 to 21.05  42.10 to 37.89  40 to 20  40 to 36  35.11 to 17.56  35.11 to 31.6 
China ↓         
        
RM  (1)  1.72 1.32 1.69 1.32 1.64 1.31 
CR  1.98 1.59 1.96 1.58 1.91 1.58 
RM  (4)  2.27 1.87 2.25 1.87 2.19 1.86 
RM  (2)  2.34 1.95 2.32 1.94 2.27 1.93 
RM  (3)  2.58 2.19 2.56 2.18 2.51 2.17 
RM  (5)  2.83 2.43 2.81 2.43 2.75 2.42 




Table 4D. Assumption: the non-China-India 1990 poverty headcount ratio is 1.5 x 20.41%=30.62% 
 
  India India India 
Scenario Æ Optimistic  Pessimistic  Optimistic  Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic 
  42.10 to 21.05  42.10 to 37.89  40 to 20  40 to 36  35.11 to 17.56  35.11 to 31.6 
China↓         
        
RM  (1)  41.38% 35.29% 41.02% 35.24% 40.19% 35.11% 
CR  45.47% 39.38% 45.11% 39.33% 44.27% 39.20% 
RM  (4)  49.81% 43.73% 49.45% 43.67% 48.62% 43.54% 
RM  (2)  50.98% 44.89% 50.62% 44.84% 49.78% 44.71% 
RM  (3)  54.64% 48.56% 54.29% 48.50% 53.45% 48.37% 
RM  (5)  58.42% 52.34% 58.07% 52.28% 57.23% 52.16% 
        
 
  India India India 
Scenario  Æ Optimistic  Pessimistic  Optimistic  Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic 
  42.10 to 21.05  42.10 to 37.89  40 to 20  40 to 36  35.11 to 17.56  35.11 to 31.6 
China ↓         
        
RM  (1)  1.35 1.15 1.34 1.15 1.31 1.15 
CR  1.49 1.29 1.47 1.28 1.45 1.28 
RM  (4)  1.63 1.43 1.62 1.43 1.59 1.42 
RM  (2)  1.67 1.47 1.65 1.46 1.63 1.46 
RM  (3)  1.78 1.59 1.77 1.58 1.75 1.58 




Table 5D. Assumption: the non-China-India 1990 poverty headcount ratio is 2 x 20.41%=40.82% 
 
  India India India 
Scenario Æ Optimistic  Pessimistic  Optimistic  Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic 
  42.10 to 21.05  42.10 to 37.89  40 to 20  40 to 36  35.11 to 17.56  35.11 to 31.6 
China↓         
        
RM  (1)  51.44% 45.35% 51.08% 45.30% 50.24% 45.17% 
CR  55.53% 49.44% 55.17% 49.38% 54.33% 49.26% 
RM  (4)  59.87% 53.79% 59.51% 53.73% 58.68% 53.60% 
RM  (2)  61.03% 54.95% 60.68% 54.89% 59.84% 54.77% 
RM  (3)  64.70% 58.62% 64.34% 58.56% 63.51% 58.43% 
RM  (5)  68.48% 62.40% 68.12% 62.34% 67.29% 62.21% 
        
 
  India India India 
Scenario  Æ Optimistic  Pessimistic  Optimistic  Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic 
  42.10 to 21.05  42.10 to 37.89  40 to 20  40 to 36  35.11 to 17.56  35.11 to 31.6 
China ↓         
        
RM  (1)  1.26 1.11 1.25 1.11 1.23 1.11 
CR  1.36 1.21 1.35 1.21 1.33 1.21 
RM  (4)  1.47 1.32 1.46 1.32 1.44 1.31 
RM  (2)  1.50 1.35 1.49 1.34 1.47 1.34 
RM  (3)  1.59 1.44 1.58 1.43 1.56 1.43 
RM  (5)  1.68 1.53 1.67 1.53 1.65 1.52 




The maximum non-China-India poverty headcount ratio in 2001 which is consistent with the hypothesis that the extent of world 
poverty (measured by the aggregate poverty headcount) has not increased between 1990 and 2001 is reported in the upper part of each 
of the tables below.  it is also expressed as a share of the non-China-India 1990 poverty headcount ratio in the lower part of each table. 
The figures in the lower part of the tables can be interpreted as the factors by which world poverty outside India and China would have 
had to increase to leave world poverty unchanged between 1990 and 2001 under the specified assumptions. If the specified 
assumptions are maintained and if it is assumed that world poverty outside India and China increased by a factor higher than that 
reported in the tables, then it must be concluded that world poverty has increased.  
 
Table 6D. Assumption: the non-China-India 1990 poverty headcount ratio is correct: 20.41 percent  
  India India India 
Scenario Æ Optimistic  Pessimistic  Optimistic  Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic 
  42.10 to 21.05  42.10 to 37.89  40 to 20  40 to 36  35.11 to 17.56  35.11 to 31.6 
China↓         
        
RM  (1)  25.00% 18.91% 24.75% 18.97% 24.18% 19.11% 
CR  27.66% 21.57% 27.41% 21.63% 26.84% 21.77% 
RM  (2)  31.88% 25.79% 31.64% 25.85% 31.06% 25.99% 
RM  (4)  32.05% 25.97% 31.81% 26.03% 31.24% 26.16% 
RM  (3)  32.86% 26.77% 32.62% 26.83% 32.05% 26.97% 
RM  (5)  37.57% 31.49% 37.33% 31.55% 36.76% 31.68% 
 
  India India India 
Scenario  Æ Optimistic  Pessimistic  Optimistic  Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic 
  42.10 to 21.05  42.10 to 37.89  40 to 20  40 to 36  35.11 to 17.56  35.11 to 31.6 
China ↓         
        
RM  (1)  1.22 0.93 1.21 0.93 1.18 0.94 
CR  1.36 1.06 1.34 1.06 1.32 1.07 
RM  (2)  1.56 1.26 1.55 1.27 1.52 1.27 
RM  (4)  1.57 1.27 1.56 1.28 1.53 1.28 
RM  (3)  1.61 1.31 1.60 1.31 1.57 1.32 
RM  (5)  1.84 1.54 1.83 1.55 1.80 1.55 
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Table 7D. Assumption: the non-China-India 1990 poverty headcount ratio is 0.5 x 20.41%=10.21% 
 
  India India India 
Scenario Æ Optimistic  Pessimistic  Optimistic  Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic 
  42.10 to 21.05  42.10 to 37.89  40 to 20  40 to 36  35.11 to 17.56  35.11 to 31.6 
China ↓         
        
RM  (1)  16.49% 10.40% 16.24% 10.46% 15.67% 10.60% 
CR  19.15% 13.06% 18.90% 13.12% 18.33% 13.25% 
RM  (2)  23.37% 17.28% 23.12% 17.34% 22.55% 17.48% 
RM  (4)  23.54% 17.46% 23.30% 17.51% 22.72% 17.65% 
RM  (3)  24.35% 18.26% 24.10% 18.32% 23.53% 18.46% 
RM  (5)  29.06% 22.98% 28.82% 23.04% 28.25% 23.17% 
        
 
  India India India 
Scenario  Æ Optimistic  Pessimistic  Optimistic  Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic 
  42.10 to 21.05  42.10 to 37.89  40 to 20  40 to 36  35.11 to 17.56  35.11 to 31.6 
China ↓         
        
RM  (1)  1.62 1.02 1.59 1.02 1.54 1.04 
CR  1.88 1.28 1.85 1.29 1.80 1.30 
RM  (2)  2.29 1.69 2.27 1.70 2.21 1.71 
RM  (4)  2.31 1.71 2.28 1.72 2.23 1.73 
RM  (5)  2.85 2.25 2.82 2.26 2.77 2.27 
RM  (3)  2.39 1.79 2.36 1.80 2.31 1.81  
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Table 8D. Assumption: the non-China-India 1990 poverty headcount ratio is 0.75 x 20.41%=15.31% 
 
  India India India 
Scenario Æ Optimistic  Pessimistic  Optimistic  Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic 
  42.10 to 21.05  42.10 to 37.89  40 to 20  40 to 36  35.11 to 17.56  35.11 to 31.6 
China↓         
        
RM  (1)  20.74% 14.66% 20.50% 14.71% 19.93% 14.85% 
CR  23.40% 17.31% 23.16% 17.37% 22.59% 17.51% 
RM  (2)  27.62% 21.54% 27.38% 21.60% 26.81% 21.73% 
RM  (4)  27.80% 21.71% 27.55% 21.77% 26.98% 21.91% 
RM  (3)  28.61% 22.52% 28.36% 22.58% 27.79% 22.71% 
RM  (5)  33.32% 27.23% 33.07% 27.29% 32.50% 27.43% 
        
 
  India India India 
Scenario  Æ Optimistic  Pessimistic  Optimistic  Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic 
  42.10 to 21.05  42.10 to 37.89  40 to 20  40 to 36  35.11 to 17.56  35.11 to 31.6 
China ↓         
        
RM  (1)  1.35 0.96 1.34 0.96 1.30 0.97 
CR  1.53 1.13 1.51 1.13 1.48 1.14 
RM  (2)  1.80 1.41 1.79 1.41 1.75 1.42 
RM  (4)  1.82 1.42 1.80 1.42 1.76 1.43 
RM  (3)  1.87 1.47 1.85 1.48 1.82 1.48 
RM  (5)  2.18 1.78 2.16 1.78 2.12 1.79 
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Table 9D. Assumption: the non-China-India 1990 poverty headcount ratio is 1.5 x 20.41%=30.62% 
 
  India India India 
Scenario Æ Optimistic  Pessimistic  Optimistic  Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic 
  42.10 to 21.05  42.10 to 37.89  40 to 20  40 to 36  35.11 to 17.56  35.11 to 31.6 
China↓         
        
RM  (1)  33.51% 27.42% 33.26% 27.48% 32.69% 27.62% 
CR  36.17% 30.08% 35.92% 30.14% 35.35% 30.28% 
RM  (2)  40.39% 34.31% 40.15% 34.36% 39.58% 34.50% 
RM  (4)  40.56% 34.48% 40.32% 34.54% 39.75% 34.67% 
RM  (3)  41.37% 35.29% 41.13% 35.34% 40.56% 35.48% 
RM  (5)  46.09% 40.00% 45.84% 40.06% 45.27% 40.19% 
        
 
  India India India 
Scenario  Æ Optimistic  Pessimistic  Optimistic  Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic 
  42.10 to 21.05  42.10 to 37.89  40 to 20  40 to 36  35.11 to 17.56  35.11 to 31.6 
China ↓         
        
RM  (1)  1.09 0.90 1.09 0.90 1.07 0.90 
CR  1.18 0.98 1.17 0.98 1.15 0.99 
RM  (2)  1.32 1.12 1.31 1.12 1.29 1.13 
RM  (4)  1.32 1.13 1.32 1.13 1.30 1.13 
RM  (3)  1.35 1.15 1.34 1.15 1.32 1.16 
RM  (5)  1.51 1.31 1.50 1.31 1.48 1.31 
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Table 10D. Assumption: the non-China-India 1990 poverty headcount ratio is 2 x 20.41%=40.82% 
 
  India India India 
Scenario Æ Optimistic  Pessimistic  Optimistic  Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic 
  42.10 to 21.05  42.10 to 37.89  40 to 20  40 to 36  35.11 to 17.56  35.11 to 31.6 
China↓         
        
RM  (1)  42.02% 35.93% 41.78% 35.99% 41.20% 36.13% 
CR  44.68% 38.59% 44.43% 38.65% 43.86% 38.79% 
RM  (2)  48.90% 42.82% 48.66% 42.88% 48.09% 43.01% 
RM  (4)  49.08% 42.99% 48.83% 43.05% 48.26% 43.18% 
RM  (3)  49.88% 43.80% 49.64% 43.86% 49.07% 43.99% 
RM  (5)  54.60% 48.51% 54.35% 48.57% 53.78% 48.71% 
        
 
  India India India 
Scenario  Æ Optimistic  Pessimistic  Optimistic  Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic 
  42.10 to 21.05  42.10 to 37.89  40 to 20  40 to 36  35.11 to 17.56  35.11 to 31.6 
China ↓         
        
RM  (1)  1.03 0.88 1.02 0.88 1.01 0.89 
CR  1.09 0.95 1.09 0.95 1.07 0.95 
RM  (2)  1.20 1.05 1.19 1.05 1.18 1.05 
RM  (4)  1.20 1.05 1.20 1.05 1.18 1.06 
RM  (3)  1.22 1.07 1.22 1.07 1.20 1.08 
RM  (5)  1.34 1.19 1.33 1.19 1.32 1.19 




Appendix E.  Comparison between ECLA and World Bank poverty estimates for 
Latin American countries  
 
 
We present below estimates of the headcount ratios published by the UN Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA) for a set of Latin American countries for two 
poverty lines: an upper nutritionally-based poverty line and a lower nutritionally-based 
poverty line (see Altimir (1979)).
 21 Only those countries for which the poverty headcount 
ratios are reported by ECLA for a year that is within five years of 1990 are included in 
the table below. We compare these with the estimates of the $1.08/day headcount ratio 
for the same countries and closest years as estimated by the CR methodology and the 
World Bank’s on-line POVCALNET database.
22  Poverty headcount ratios for the region 




   CR    ECLA 
Country  Year   1990 Poverty 
headcount ratio 
Year Poverty  headcount 
ratios 









          
Brazil 1990  14.04  1990 41  18 
Chile 1990  4.85  1990 33  11 
Colombia 1991  2.82  1991  50  23 
Costa Rica  1990  5.24  1990  24  10 
El Salvador  1995  25.05  1995  48  19 
Guatemala 1987  47.04  1986  68  43 
Honduras 1990  37.83  1990  75  54 
Mexico 1989  8.32    1989  39  14 
Panama 1991  11.81    1991  36  16 
Peru 1985.5  1.14  1986 52  25 
Venezuela 1990  2.97    1990  34  12 
          
Latin America  1990  11.64  1990  41  18 
 
 
                                                 
21 The Economic Commission for Latin America Social Panorama of Latin America, 1990-2000 (Spanish 
version), pp. 269-270. http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/SecretariaEjecutiva/8/lcg2068/Anexos_2000.pdf 
(accessed 05.26.2005).  
22 The database is available at: http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp  
23 The ECLA headcount ratio for Latin America is as reported in Table 14 of the Social Panorama of Latin 
America, 1990-2000. The CR headcount ratio for Latin America was calculated using POVCALNET for 
1990, aggregating exactly the same set of countries as included in the ECLA table to produce a regional 
headcount ratio. Default PPPs were used.  
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Appendix F.  Results (Poverty line: $ 2.15 / day)  
 
 
Table 1F.  Minimum 2001 non-China-India poverty headcount ratio consistent with the 
world poverty headcount ratio having increased between 1990 and 2001. The lower part 
of the table contains the ratio between the 2001 non-China-India HCR and the assumed 
1990 HCR, i.e., the maximum increase in poverty outside China and India consistent with 




24 multiplied by 














RM  (4)*  36.09% 47.46% 58.83% 81.58%  104.33% 
RM  (1)*  37.20% 48.57% 59.95% 82.69%  105.44% 
CR 2004   37.43%  48.80%  60.18%  82.92%  105.67% 
RM (6)*   40.32%  51.70%  63.07%  85.82%  108.57% 
RM (2)*   41.61%  52.98%  64.35%  87.10%  109.85% 
RM (5)*   45.01%  56.39%  67.76%  90.51%  113.26% 
       
       
       
RM  (4)*  1.56 1.37 1.27 1.18 1.13 
RM  (1)*  1.61 1.40 1.30 1.19 1.14 
CR  2004    1.62 1.41 1.30 1.20 1.14 
RM  (6)*    1.75 1.49 1.37 1.24 1.18 
RM  (2)*    1.80 1.53 1.39 1.26 1.19 
RM  (5)*    1.95 1.63 1.47 1.31 1.23 
       
 
                                                 
24 46.16 percent.  
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Table 2F.  Minimum 2001 non-China-India poverty headcount ratio consistent with the 
world aggregate poverty headcount having increased between 1990 and 2001. The second 
part of the table contains the ratio between the 2001 non-China-India HCR and the 
assumed 1990 HCR, i.e. the maximum increase in poverty outside China and India 





25 multiplied by 














CR  2004    24.03% 33.66% 43.28% 62.53% 81.78% 
RM  (6)*    25.22% 34.84% 44.46% 63.71% 82.96% 
RM  (1)*  25.54% 35.17% 44.79% 64.04% 83.29% 
RM  (4)*  25.75% 35.37% 45.00% 64.24% 83.49% 
RM  (2)*    27.18% 36.80% 46.43% 65.68% 84.93% 
RM  (5)*    31.57% 41.19% 50.82% 70.07% 89.32% 
       
       
CR  2004    1.04 0.97 0.94 0.90 0.89 
RM  (6)*    1.09 1.01 0.96 0.92 0.90 
RM  (1)*  1.11 1.02 0.97 0.92 0.90 
RM  (4)*  1.12 1.02 0.97 0.93 0.90 
RM  (2)*    1.18 1.06 1.01 0.95 0.92 
RM  (5)*    1.37 1.19 1.10 1.01 0.97 




                                                 
25 46.16 percent. 
 